ISLAMABAD: The Arms Control and Disarmament Centre (ACDC) at the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI) hosted a high-level roundtable discussion titled “India’s Sea-Based Nuclear Capabilities: Implications for Pakistan,” bringing together leading strategic experts, diplomats and military analysts to assess the changing deterrence landscape in South Asia.
The discussion focused on the qualitative shift in the region’s security architecture following the operational deployment of India’s sea-based nuclear arsenal and its implications for Pakistan’s deterrence posture.
In his welcome remarks, Ambassador Khalid Mehmood, Chairman of the Board of Governors, ISSI, underscored the seriousness of the evolving regional security environment. He said the operationalisation of India’s sea-based nuclear deterrent represented a qualitative and structural shift in regional security, requiring a clear reassessment of deterrence postures and diplomatic frameworks to protect regional peace and stability.
Earlier, Malik Qasim Mustafa, Director ACDC, opened the session by welcoming the participants and outlining the scope of the discussion. He said the disruption to South Asian strategic stability required a rigorous assessment of possible doctrinal and technological posture adjustments necessary for Pakistan to retain a credible deterrent.
Setting the agenda, Ghazala Yasmin Jalil, Research Fellow at ACDC, referred to structural turning points facing the region, including the movement from recessed deterrence to mated warheads. She raised key questions on how Pakistan could maintain robust Full Spectrum Deterrence without entering an expensive and open-ended naval arms race. She suggested that durable security would lie in negotiating strong maritime Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs).
The roundtable featured detailed thematic presentations by a panel of strategic thinkers. Vice Admiral (Retd.) Dr Ahmed Saeed HI(M), former President of the National Institute of Maritime Affairs (NIMA), pointed to a growing strategic imbalance in the Indian Ocean caused by India’s major investment in advanced conventional and nuclear submarines, including SSBNs. He warned that rapid naval expansion was creating serious defence asymmetry, lowering the nuclear threshold and increasing the risk of inadvertent escalation between two contiguous nuclear-armed states.
To address maritime risks and prevent an unchecked arms race, Admiral Saeed called for strong bilateral CBMs and a renewed diplomatic effort to declare the Indian Ocean a non-nuclear domain. He maintained that maritime nuclear conflict offered no route to military victory and required mutual strategic restraint.
Ambassador (Retd.) Zamir Akram, Advisor to the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), warned that India’s rapid vertical proliferation was encouraging a dangerous movement away from its “No First Use” policy towards a pre-emptive first-strike posture aimed at neutralising Pakistan’s Full Spectrum Deterrence. He rejected the view that these assets were directed only at China and drew attention to what he described as the “deafening silence” and double standards of the international community over India’s expanding sea-based capabilities.
He said the development posed a threat beyond South Asia and undermined strategic stability at regional and global levels. Ambassador Akram urged Pakistan to expose India’s irresponsible nuclear behaviour internationally, establish strong crisis-management mechanisms instead of relying on weak bilateral arrangements, and strengthen its defensive posture by fully operationalising and deploying nuclear warheads across land, air and sea-based triad capabilities to ensure a credible and survivable second-strike capability.
Air Commodore (Retd.) Khalid Banuri, Senior Advisor JCCL, Air Headquarters, said India’s transition to a permanently mated sea-based nuclear presence had sharply compressed political-military decision-making windows and reduced traditional peacetime buffers. He examined crisis instability risks, noting that the opacity of the sea leg blurred conventional and nuclear signalling and increased the danger of unintended escalation and inadvertent launch.
He said India’s “No First Use” doctrine had become practically meaningless under the new posture, placing pressure on Pakistan’s credible deterrence amid fiscal constraints and the destabilising integration of emerging technologies. He suggested that Pakistan’s optimal response should combine modern technologies, a survivable and strengthened second-strike capability, and proactive diplomatic initiatives to preserve strategic stability and avoid a costly arms race.
Dr Aqeel Akhtar discussed the security dilemma linked to sea-based nuclear deterrence, observing that the growing deployment of nuclear submarines created fresh challenges for command and control, crisis communication and strategic stability. He stressed the need to strengthen secure communication systems, reduce risks of miscalculation and develop robust safeguards to prevent inadvertent escalation in an increasingly complex maritime security environment.
The presentations were followed by an interactive open discussion, during which members of the strategic community, academia and media exchanged views on policy options available to Pakistan for maintaining strategic equilibrium.
