BY: Qurat ul Ain Ali Khawaja
Published by ANI
As world leaders gather for the 81st session of the United Nations General Assembly, South Asia is confronting a crisis that extends beyond the India-Pakistan rivalry. The disputes surrounding Jammu and Kashmir are increasingly intersecting with human rights, international law and one of the world’s most strategically important transboundary river systems.
The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), signed in 1960, has survived wars, military confrontations and prolonged diplomatic tensions between India and Pakistan. Its latest and most consequential challenge emerged after India announced in April 2025 that it was placing the treaty “in abeyance.”
On August 31, 2026, the Court of Arbitration constituted under the treaty issued an award concerning the status of the Indus Waters Treaty and an order on interim measures concerning India’s 850-megawatt Ratle Hydroelectric Plant. The Permanent Court of Arbitration records the proceedings as pending. India has rejected the tribunal’s jurisdiction and maintains that the decision does not affect its position.
The dispute therefore raises a fundamental question of international law: can a state unilaterally place a treaty in abeyance while rejecting the authority of the treaty’s agreed dispute-resolution mechanism?
Pakistan’s Water Vulnerability
Pakistan’s dependence on the Indus Basin makes the issue particularly significant. According to the Pakistan Economic Survey 2025–26, the country receives an average of 138.4 million acre-feet (MAF) of water annually from its western and eastern rivers.
Pakistan’s surface irrigation infrastructure extends across nearly 64,000 kilometres and irrigates approximately 47 million acres. The three major reservoirs—Tarbela, Mangla and Chashma—have a combined live storage capacity of about 13.44 MAF. The Economic Survey also notes that per-capita annual water availability has fallen below 1,000 cubic metres.
During 2025–26, surface-water availability stood at 92.0 MAF, compared with average system usage of 103.5 MAF. This represents a gap of approximately 11.1 per cent compared with average system usage.
These figures demonstrate why changes in river flows, upstream infrastructure and access to reliable hydrological information can have direct implications for agriculture, food security and energy generation.
Reuters has described the Indus Waters Treaty as crucial to a water system serving about 80 per cent of Pakistan’s farms.
A Treaty Based on Division and Predictability
The treaty was designed as a framework for managing a shared river system rather than giving either country unrestricted control over the entire Indus Basin.
Under the agreement, the eastern rivers—Ravi, Beas and Sutlej—were allocated principally for India’s use, while Pakistan received the principal use of the western rivers—Indus, Jhelum and Chenab—subject to specified Indian uses.
This distinction is central to the current dispute. India retains treaty-based rights to develop certain hydroelectric projects on the western rivers. The legal questions concern whether particular projects and their design and operational features comply with the treaty.
The Ratle Hydroelectric Plant on the Chenab has consequently become an important focal point. The August 31 order concerning interim measures placed restrictions on specified construction activity while treaty-compliance issues continue to be examined through the treaty’s mechanisms. The broader proceedings remain pending.
The controversy surrounding an 850MW project therefore represents a larger test of whether technical safeguards contained in a decades-old treaty retain practical force during periods of severe political tension.
Kashmir and the Human-Rights Dimension
The water dispute is unfolding alongside continuing international attention to developments in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir.
The OIC Contact Group on Jammu and Kashmir met in New York on September 22, 2026, on the sidelines of the 81st UN General Assembly. According to the OIC’s news agency, the group reaffirmed support for the Kashmiri people’s right to self-determination and expressed concern about the humanitarian, human-rights and security situation in the territory.
The Contact Group also called for respect for the territory’s international status and greater international efforts toward human-rights documentation and transparency. India rejects the OIC’s characterisation of Jammu and Kashmir and maintains its own position on the territory.
The figures cited by the OIC regarding arrests and domicile certificates also require attribution. The Contact Group has cited the arrest of around 2,800 people following the Pahalgam attack and said more than 3.4 million domicile certificates had been issued in the territory since 2019. These are figures presented by the Contact Group and should not be treated as independently verified measurements without further documentation.
Kashmir and the Indus: Connected but Distinct
The Kashmir dispute and the Indus Waters Treaty should not be conflated. They are separate legal and political questions. However, their geographic relationship cannot be ignored.
The western rivers covered by the treaty originate in or pass through the wider Himalayan region, meaning that developments upstream can have strategic significance for Pakistan’s downstream water security.
That does not mean that every Indian hydropower project constitutes a treaty violation. Rather, it highlights why the treaty’s technical requirements, information-sharing arrangements and dispute-resolution mechanisms remain important as upstream infrastructure expands and climate and hydrological conditions become more unpredictable.
Pakistan’s water challenge already exists independently of the bilateral dispute. The Economic Survey identifies limited storage capacity, climate change, glacier melt, groundwater stress, conveyance losses, population growth and increasing demand among the factors placing pressure on the country’s water resources.
The International-Law Question
The August 31, 2026 proceedings have now placed the disagreement over the treaty’s status firmly within the international legal record.
The Permanent Court of Arbitration lists the case as an interstate arbitration between Pakistan and India under the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty. Its case record includes the August 31 award concerning India’s decision on abeyance as well as the order on interim measures concerning Ratle.
India, however, has rejected the tribunal’s jurisdiction and its conclusions. Reuters reported that New Delhi maintains that the ruling does not affect its sovereign decisions or ongoing hydroelectric projects.
The resulting disagreement is therefore not simply about one hydroelectric project. It concerns the wider principle of whether treaty-based institutions can continue to function when relations between the parties deteriorate sharply.
That question has significance beyond South Asia. Rivers cross political borders across Africa, Asia, Europe and the Middle East, while population growth, climate variability, agriculture, energy requirements and urbanisation are increasing pressure on shared water resources.
UNGA 81 and the Need for Transparency
The renewed diplomatic activity around Kashmir at the United Nations demonstrates that the issue remains part of international diplomacy. The OIC Contact Group has reiterated its position on self-determination and called for greater attention to human-rights concerns, while India continues to reject the group’s position.
Competing diplomatic statements alone cannot resolve these differences. Greater transparency is essential.
For Kashmir, this includes credible documentation of arrests, detentions, political restrictions, property demolitions and conditions affecting journalists and civil society.
For the Indus Basin, it means reliable hydrological information, technical cooperation, functioning treaty institutions and respect for agreed procedures for resolving disputes.
A 66-Year-Old Treaty at a Critical Moment
The Indus Waters Treaty has survived for 66 years, including periods when India and Pakistan were at war or faced severe diplomatic confrontation. Its longevity demonstrated that technical cooperation over water could continue even when political relations were deeply strained.
Its present crisis therefore deserves international attention.
Pakistan’s exposure can be measured through concrete figures: nearly 47 million acres of irrigated land, an average annual water supply of 138.4 MAF, 92.0 MAF of surface-water availability during 2025–26 and an irrigation network extending roughly 64,000 kilometres.
India’s position is that its security concerns and objections to the treaty’s dispute-resolution process justify its present stance. The international arbitration process has reached a different conclusion regarding the treaty’s continuing status.
The central question for the international community is therefore not which country wins a diplomatic argument. It is whether international law and treaty mechanisms can continue to provide predictable rules when bilateral politics become most hostile.
If shared-water agreements are to remain meaningful, their text, technical procedures and dispute-resolution mechanisms must retain practical relevance. The future stability of the Indus Basin will depend not only on water management and infrastructure, but also on whether India and Pakistan can preserve institutional mechanisms capable of managing their differences.
The consequences of failure would extend beyond the Chenab, Jhelum and Indus—to a wider international system in which millions of people depend on rivers that cross national borders.
